STRATEGIC TECHNICAL DIRECTORATE (STD)

CHAPTER 1

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

I - STRATEGIC TECHNICAL DIRECTORATE (STD)

MISSION

(S) To exercise operational command over forces and personnel assigned or attached in the execution of special operations or in the conduct of unconventional warfare as directed by the Joint General Staff/Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (JGS/RVNAF).

BACKGROUND

(TS) Because of increased communist activities in the Republic of Vietnam after the 1954 Geneva  Accords, a secret special service was established in 1958 under the control of the President,  Republic of Vietnam. The mission of this secret agency was to obtain intelligence on communist activities north of the DMZ, and to locate strategic targets for destruction in the event of open hostilities with the North. In 1963, the secret service was redesignated the Vietnamese Special Forces Command. [DATA REDACTED]A REDACTED

The forerunner of the present Strategic Technical Directorate (STD) was organized under the

name Special Branch (SB) within the Special Forces Command. The SB consisted of two sections. 
One section was responsible for in-country support sites. These support sites were located

in Saigon for Airborne Operations, in Hue for cross-DMZ operations, and in Da Nang for

Seaborne operations. The second section was responsible for out-of-country support sites,

which were established in Vientiane, Laos, Savannakhet, Laos, Bangkok, Thailand and Paris, France. The out-of-country support sections recruited potential agents for training in clandestine intelligence and interdiction operations. Because of funding problems, however, the out-of country program was eventually eliminated.

(TS) By 1964, the situation in RVN had become so critical that the SB  was unable to handle escalating special operations requirements. Because of this situation, the SB was reorganized as an independent unit, separate from Special Forces Command. In April 1964 the SB officially became the Special Exploitation Service (SES) and was placed under the command control of the JGS. Concurrent with the formation of SES, its counterpart US organization, Studies and Observation Group (SOG) was created. SOG assumed the responsibility for the support of SES special and unconventional warfare operations. (TS) SES was organized with a Headquarters element in Saigon, the Coastal Security Service (CSS) in Da Nang, the Airborne Training Camp at Long Thanh, and attached VNAF elements. The VNAF elements included several special aircrews operating in close coordination with the MACSOG First Flight Detachment in Nha Trang.

(S) During the latter part of 1964, the NVA increased its infiltration of troops and supplies into

RVN via the Ho Chi Minh trail. In response, SES was again enlarged in early 1965. Activated in

April 1964 under the aegis of JGS to conduct reconnaissance in Laos and Cambodia, the previously autonomous Liaison Service (LS) was assigned to SES in January 1965. The SES was subsequently redesignated the Strategic Technical Service (STS). For the first time one agency was responsible to JCS for all special and UW operations supporting the RVN counterinsurgency program.

(S) By September 1967 the STS had grown considerably. To accommodate its new status, STS

was redesignated the Strategic Technical Directorate (STD). The Director STD reported directly to the Chief of the JGS. At this time, the major subordinate units were the Liaison Service, the Coastal Security Service, the Special Task Force, the Airborne Training Center, and the Coordination and Liaison Detachment. Also, the STD Psywar Division was greatly enlarged to meet the growing needs of UW and Special Operations.

(S) In mid-1970, because of the deactivation of the US 5th Special Group, STD absorbed the

Vietnamese Special Forces Command, which was redesignated the Special Mission Service

(SMS). The resulting organization is shown in Figure 1.1 and has remained essentially unchanged to the present.

ORGANIZATION

(S) STD was organized into two major field units, the Liaison Service and the Special Mission

Service. LS was given the mission of conducting operations in Cambodia and the Republic of

Vietnam south of the tri-border area; and SMS of conducting operations in Laos in SVN north

of’the tri-border area. In addition to general intelligence collection, LS and SMS teams were

trained to conduct wiretaps, prisoner snatch operations, road and trail mining, and to direct

TACA1R and artillery on lucrative targets.

(S) The Liaison Service was organized (Figure 1.2) with three task forces, along with combat

service support elements. The capabilities of LS were somewhat reduced after May 1972 as a

result of the deactivation of its Special Commando Unit (SCU) exploitation and security companies.

(S) The Special Mission Service was authorized five operational groups, but only four were assigned.

The organization of SMS operational units was similar to a Special Forces “A” Detachment,

and was developed to facilitate the conduct of unconventional warfare operations in North

Vietnam and Laos. SMS was organized as shown in Figure 1.3.

(TS) Additionally, STD had two autonomous subordinate units assigned, Group 11 and Group

68 located in Da Nang and Saigon, respectively. Group 11 consisted of nine 12-man STRATA

teams, so called because of their mission: Short Term Reconnaissance and Target Acquisition.

These teams were trained in the conduct of road and trail recon, wiretaps, reconnaissance of selected enemy installations, and target acquisition for airstrikes. Group 68 was responsible for

two clandestine agent operations. The first of these, the Earth Angel program, employed NVA

ralliers in three and four man intelligence collection teams. These personnel, carefully screened

and recruited from Chieu Hoi Centers, were required to pass a polygraph examination before

being accepted into the program. The second program was codenamed Pike Hill, and referred to Ethnic Khmer Intelligence Collection Operations. Pike Hill personnel were South Vietnamese citizens of Cambodian ancestry organized into three and five man teams for long term reconnaissance/ intelligence operations in Cambodia. For security purposes Group 68 headquarters was located in Saigon, while the operational teams were billeted and trained at Camp Yen The near Long Thanh, RVN.

OPERATIONS AND CAPABILITIES

(TS) Until early 1972, STD was tasked with cross-border operations only; however, the NVA

offensive in April 1972 necessitated a reorientation of STD operations so as to concentrate on

in-country tactical reconnaissance operations in support of the hard-pressed Military Regions

(MR’s) This change in employment of STD was also due in part to the loss of US air assets, and

the detachment on 5 May 1972 of the VNAF, 219th HELO Squadron. These events considerably

reduced STD’s capability to respond independently to cross-border reconnaissance missions

as deve1oped at the MACV and JGS intelligence targeting levels. Though the strategic role of

STD atrophied to a marked degree, tactical reconnaissance operations (in excess of 200 separate reconnaissance team (RT) missions) in support of the MR’s were instrumental in producing intelligence vital to RVNAF efforts to counter the NVA invasion and kept the RT’s of LS and SMS in a high state of preparedness for their primary mission of intelligence collection operations in North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

II. - STRATEGIC TECHNICAL DIRECTORATE ASSISTANCE TEAM-158 (STDAT-158)

BACKGROUND AND MISSIONS

(TS) Upon the deactivation on 30 April 1972, of MACSOG (see 1971-72 MACV Command

History, Annex B, p. B-1), which had carefully nurtured STD through the improvement and

modernization programs of the past two years, a jointly staffed advisory agency was formed

from residual MACSOG personnel, and designated the Strategic Technical Directorate Assistance Team-158 (STDAT-158). Consisting of a total of 152 Army, 6 Navy, and 2 Air Force personnel, STDAT-158 was organized as shown in Figure 1.4. STDAT-158 was chartered under a Secret missions and functions letter directive, dated 30 April 1972, signed by the MACV Chief

of Staff. STDAT was activated on 1 May 1972 and was charged with providing advice, assistance, and limited financial and material support to STD; with developing, within capabilities, combined plans for special operations and unconventional warfare; and with maintaining direct liaison between STD and MACV agencies concerned with intelligence collection and related operational matters. STDAT was also directed to keep MACJ2 and J3 (later MACDI & DO) informed as to STD activities, to exert all possible efforts to insure that STD operations best served the objectives of the US MACV, and to encourage STD to consider intelligence collection requirements specified by MACDI. As a parallel to the direct command relationship existing between STD and JGS, STDAT-158 Cmdr/SA reported directly to C/S MACV. As a cover, STDAT-158 was shown on the MACV organizational chart as a subordinate element of Army Advisory Group. Finally, STDAT-158 was charged by C/S MACV with serving as the MACV point of contact [DATA REDACTED]

DATA REDACTED

STDAT-158 was later directed, in addition to its advisory missions, to organize, equip, train and

employ a Special Mission Force (SMF) and Coastal Recovery Force (CRF), whose organizational details and operational activities are described more fully in later chapters. Until mid-November 1972, STDAT-158 maintained field advisory elements at each of the STD locations depicted in figure 1.5. MACV drawdown Increment 14 required a reorganization of STDAT-158 and a reduction in personnel to 42 Army, 1 Navy, and 1 Air Force. The resulting organization is shown in Figure 1.6. Effective 1 December 1972, STDAT continued in its advisory and assistance role, its capabilities greatly reduced in relation to what they were under its previous organization. Owing directly to the impact of the NVA offensive in April and the continued reduction of US forces in RVN, STDAT, for its part in the overall advisory effort, directed the majority of its energies and talents to the following:

1. Planning and coordinating its own drawdown imposed reorganization.

2. Fulfilling its responsibility to place STD in as sound an operational and logistics posture

as time would allow.

3. Developing the SMF, and CRF as rapidly as possible into forces operationally ready to

peform their assigned missions.

4. At the direction of C/S MACV, in response to an urgent request from the Commander

Second Military Region Assistance Command, forming and deploying a Special Training Team

(STT). STT was organized and supported from STDAT resources, and was tasked with the

conduct of a ranger training program for selected MR II reconnaissance and ranger companies.

The objective of the STT training program was to upgrade II Corps capability to conduct deep

penetration operations (ambush, raid, reconnaissance) in enemy rear areas.

(TS) Meeting the first of these four general tasks complicated efforts to realize the other three.

Careful planning, in particular, was required in order to support the STT right up to the time

that Increment 14 drawdown necessitated its deactivation, turnover of its equipment, reassignment of its personnel, and turnover of responsibility for conduct of the training to ARVN training cadre.

(TS) The most serious advisory problem encountered during the period covered by this history

concerned STDAT’s endeavors to influence the employment of STD forces following the stabilization of the tactical situation in the aftermath of the NVA Invasion in April. This problem had its focus in efforts to reverse the JGS concept for employing STD forces. The invasion caused a shift in emphasis in the prevailing JGS concept from strategic to tactical intelligence collection,

as already mentioned. In April 1972, MR-I, MR-II, and MR-III, and the Capital Military District

(CMD) were given operational control over STD forces, and began to employ them in the respective Corps and CMD areas of tactical responsibility. The detachment in May of STD’s dedicated 219th HELO Squadron made STD completely dependent on Corps air assets for its operations and thus firmly lodged STD into a tactical as opposed to a strategic intelligence collection role. Although STD played an important part in the overall RVNAF effort to counter the NVA offensive, the tactical situation had stabilized enough by October to justify STDAT efforts to influence, by direct liaison with STD and though the MACV command chain, a redirection in STD’s operational emphasis from a tactical to a strategic role. Even though no formal change in STD’s commitment in support of the MR’s was announced or directed as a result of STDAT’s liaison/advisory activities directed to this end, a de facto situation recognizing such a change was apparent. The MR’s seemed to become aware of the dangerous inertia which had developed with respect to strategic reconnaissance. In mid-November they began to make air assets available and to encourage targeting of operations in the Laos and Cambodia base areas. As of this writing ten cross-border operations have been conducted following this renewal of strategic interest.

(TS) Another major advisory undertaking, concerned the planning, training, and coordination of STD support of special, notional, and psywar operations developed in connection with

CINCPAC CONPLAN 1508 (CINCPAC Message 060333Z June 72), the sensitivity of which

exceeds the security classification of this document. The professional manner in which STD elements responded to the requirements of this plan gave direct evidence of the viable counterpart relationship that had been developed between STD and STDAT. (TS) In response to the President’s order to halt all US military activities against the DRV and in anticipation of the cease-fire, on 15 January 1973, JCS cancelled all STDAT authorities for special operations against the DRV. With the signing of the Peace Treaty on 28 January 1973,

STDAT prepared to standdown and transferred House 50* supplies to STD. On 12 March 1973,

STDAT was deactivated.

(S) The chapters which follow present in more detail the advisory and, in the case of SMF and

CRF, the operational efforts of STDAT-158. For the most part, the history of STDAT was

bound up part and parcel with that of its STD counterpart. In some areas, control and support of SMF and CRF and logistical and administrative support of its organic agencies and personnel, the two organizations functioned quite separately. In the case of the STT mission and in the targeting and conduct of operational missions, the history of one generally coincided with that of the other. The RT operations portion of subsequent chapters, therefore, describe events jointly significant to STDAT and STD.

(TS) Added: On 9 February 1973, Cmdr/SA met with COMUSMACV and Chief/Vietnamese Joint General Staff (Chief/JGS) to discuss the impact of the deactivation of Team 158 on the operational capabilities of STD. The following specific areas of impact were identified and discussed:

1. (TS) All funding support of STD special operations and UW training/operations would

be terminated. Group 68 would, as a result, be deactivated. Earth Angels were to be discharged

and Pike Hills drafted into ARVN and left assigned to STD.

2. (C) The limited contract airlift support of STD would terminate.

3. (S) STD‘s access to MACDI‘s aerial reconnaissance mechanisms for acquiring intelligence

for mission planning would terminate.

4. (S) Although STD would inherit a sizeable logistics facility and inventory from Team

158, STD would no longer have access, through its assistance team, to a special equipment acquisition system. It was estimated that in most commodity areas present special equipment

stocks would sustain STD in excess of one year at its current level of operations.

(S) Discussion also focused on those measures necessary to reestablish STD in its primary role

of strategic intelligence collection. Chief/JGS stated that the 219th HELO Squadron would be

returned to dedicated support of STD. Finally Chief/JGS was informed that a US liaison officer

assigned to the residual US military element, Defense Attache Office, would be the point of

contact for coordination of the employment of STD forces in the conduct of post cease-fire

casualty resolution activities.